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INTRODUCTION 
 
In its 5-4 decision in Epic Systems v. Lewis,1 the Supreme Court held 
that, absent “a clear and manifest congressional command to displace” the 
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)’s requirement that arbitration agreements be 
enforced as written, class action waivers in employment agreements are 
generally enforceable.2 Specifically, the Court rejected the argument that Section 
7 of the National Labor Relations Act’s protection of “concerted activity”3 
constituted a sufficiently “clear and manifest congressional command” to 
displace the FAA.4 Dissenting with three other justices, Justice Ginsburg 
cautioned that the Court’s ruling could lead to “anomalous results” because of 
the operation of provisions in arbitration agreements requiring confidentiality or 
barring arbitrators from giving prior proceedings precedential effect. As a result, 
the dissent noted, “arbitrators may render conflicting awards in cases involving 
similarly situated employees—even employees working for the same employer. 
Arbitrators may resolve differently such questions as whether certain jobs are 
exempt from overtime laws . . . With confidentiality and no-precedential value 
provisions operative, irreconcilable answers would remain unchecked.”5 
Whether or not one agrees with the Court’s holding in Epic Systems, 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent raises the important question whether there are means 
other than class or collective actions to avoid duplicative or inconsistent 
litigation of employment claims in arbitration. In this article, we urge greater use 
one of such device—the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion6—to 
spare employees from having to separately relitigate against their employer an 
																																								 																				
1 Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1624 (2018).  
2 Under the Court’s FAA precedents, arbitration agreements are generally valid and 
enforceable absent a “contrary congressional command” in a separate statute. See, e.g. 
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98 (2012). “The party opposing arbitration 
carries the burden of showing that Congress intended in a separate statute to preclude a 
waiver of judicial remedies, or that such a waiver of judicial remedies inherently conflicts 
with the underlying purposes of that other statute.” Shearson/American Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 
477, 483 (1989). 
3 Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act guarantees the right of workers “to engage 
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1935). 
4 Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S.Ct. at 1624. 
5 Id. at 1648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).  
6 Throughout this Essay, we use the terms “collateral estoppel” and “issue preclusion” 
interchangeably according to the taxonomy recommended by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF JUDGMENTS, § 31 (1982); the concept of issue preclusion is distinguished from claim 
preclusion, which was traditionally called “res judicata.”       
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issue that has already been resolved in favor of other employees of the same 
employer in previous arbitrations. We argue below that, with certain 
modifications to the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”)’s Employ-
ment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures as well as its Employment 
Due Process Protocol,7 consistent resolution of similar claims or issues in 
multiple arbitration proceedings can be promoted while retaining the core 
benefits of arbitration.8  
 
I. ISSUE PRECLUSION IN COURTS AND ARBITRATION 
 
It is well-established, as recognized by the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments, that under the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, 
“[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and 
final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the 
determination is conclusive in a subsequent action.”9 While the doctrine was 
traditionally limited to parties involved in previous litigation, the Supreme Court 
relaxed this requirement in Blonger-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of 
Illinois Foundation,10 holding that a defendant may invoke non-mutual issue 
preclusion defensively against a plaintiff that had lost on the same dispositive 
issue in an earlier suit. The Court further relaxed the mutuality requirement in 
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,11 permitting, as a matter of federal common law, 
the offensive use of non-mutual issue preclusion. As a result of this decision, 
federal courts have “broad discretion” to permit a plaintiff who had not been a 
																																								 																				
7 AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES 
(effective Nov. 1, 2009), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Employment%20Rules.pdf 
[hereinafter AAA, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES]; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, EMPLOY-
MENT DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (effective May. 9, 1995), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/ 
document_repository/Employment%20Due%20Process%20Protocol_0.pdf [hereinafter AAA, 
DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL].   
8 As one of us has written, “[p]rivate arbitration will never, and should not, entirely supplant 
agency or court jurisdiction. But if properly designed, private arbitration can complement public 
enforcement and, at the same time, satisfy the public interest objectives of the various statutes 
governing the employment relationship.” Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate 
Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1349 (1997).  
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). The Second Circuit, for example, 
distills the doctrine in the following manner: collateral estoppel bars litigation of an issue 
when “(1) the identical issue was raised in a previous proceeding; (2) the issue was actually 
litigated and decided in the previous proceeding; (3) the party had a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate the issue; and (4) the resolution of the issue was necessary to support a valid and 
final judgment on the merits.” Boguslavsky v. Kaplan, 159 F.3d 715, 720 (2d Cir. 1998).  
10 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971). 
11 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979).  
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party to the previous lawsuit to “estop a defendant from re-litigating the issues 
which the defendant previously litigated and lost against another plaintiff.”12 The 
Parklane Court cautioned, however, that “[t]he general rule should be that in 
cases where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action or where the 
application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge 
should not allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel.”13 In the Court’s view, 
it would be unfair to allow non-mutual issue preclusion: (1) if the defendant in 
the first action was “sued for small or nominal damages” and thus had “little 
incentive to defend vigorously, particularly if future suits [were] not fore-
seeable”; (2) if the judgment relied upon as a basis for the estoppel is itself 
inconsistent with one or more previous judgments in favor of the defendant; or 
(3) “where the second action affords the defendant procedural opportunities 
unavailable in the first action that could readily cause a different result.”14 
It is now also well-established that “final arbitral awards are afforded 
the same preclusive effects as are prior court judgments.”15 That is because 
of a long-standing presumption, as stated in the Restatement (Second) of 
																																								 																				
12 Id. at 329. 
13 Id. at 330.  
14 Id. at 330-31. 
15 Manganella v. Evanston Ins. Co., 700 F.3d 585, 591 (lst Cir. 2012) (affirming district court’s 
order giving preclusive effect to arbitral determination that former company president seeking 
indemnification in a sexual harassment suit had willfully violated anti-harassment policy). See 
also Boguslavsky v. Kaplan, 159 F.3d 715, 720 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming the district court’s 
application of defensive issue preclusion to arbitral determination of claims arising under the 
Securities Exchange Act). The Fifth Circuit in 1991 upheld the use of non-mutual issue preclusion 
with respect to issues decided in arbitration, but limited preclusion to cases “not directly involving 
federal statutory or constitutional rights.” Universal Am. Barge Corp. v. J-Chem, Inc., 946 F.2d 
1131, 1136 (5th Cir. 1991). That exception was based on the Supreme Court’s holding in 
McDonald v. City of West Branch, Mich. that “in a § 1983 action, a federal court should not afford 
res judicata or collateral-estoppel effect to an award in an arbitration proceeding brought pursuant 
to the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement.” 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984). McDonald may no 
longer be good law in light of 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 264 (2009) (holding 
that the line of cases culminating with McDonald does not “control the outcome where . . . the 
collective-bargaining agreement’s arbitration provision expressly covers both statutory and 
contractual discrimination claims.”). In any event, the Fifth Circuit appears to have reversed itself 
in Grimes v. BNSF Ry. Co. 746 F.3d 184, 188 (5th Cir. 2014) (“As a general matter, arbitral 
proceedings can have preclusive effect even in litigation involving federal statutory and 
constitutional rights”). The Supreme Court, it should be noted, expressly declined to rule on the 
question in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd. 470 U.S. 213, 223 (1985). Professor Christopher 
Drahozal suggests that McDonald stands for the considerably more limited exception that courts 
should not give preclusive effect to issues decided in arbitration when adjudicating nonarbitrable 
statutory claims. Christopher Drahozal, The Issue Preclusive Effect of Arbitration Awards, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NYU 69TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR: MEDIATION AND 
ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND CONSUMER DISPUTES 10 (Elizabeth C, Tippett ed., 2018). 
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Judgments, that a “valid and final award by arbitration has the same effects 
under the rules of res judicata, subject to the same exceptions and 
qualifications, as a judgment of a court.”16 The same principle is at least 
implicitly codified in the FAA: when a party obtains judicial confirmation of 
an arbitration award pursuant to Section 9 of the statute, Section 13 provides 
that the confirming judgment “shall have the same force and [thus preclusive] 
effect” as a judgment in an action.17  
As Gary Born, a leading commentator, has observed,18 under federal 
common law, courts have broad discretion to give arbitral rulings preclusive 
effect even for unconfirmed awards.19 As noted by the Fifth Circuit, relevant 
factors include whether: (1) “arbitral pleadings state issues clearly”;  
(2) “arbitrators set out and explain their findings in a detailed written opinion”; 
(3) “procedural differences between arbitration and the district court proceeding 
might prejudice the party challenging the use of” offensive, non-mutual 
preclusion; (4) procedural differences “might be likely to cause a different 
result”; (5) the findings of the arbitral panel “are within the panel’s authority and 
expertise”; and (6) “the arbitration proceeding affords basic elements of 
adjudicatory procedure, such as an opportunity for presentation of evidence.”20  
																																								 																				
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(1) (1982). The Restatement provision identifies 
two exceptions: (1) if giving the award preclusive effect “would be incompatible with a legal 
policy or contractual provision that the tribunal in which the issue subsequently arises be free to 
make an independent determination of the issue in question, or with a purpose of the arbitration 
agreement that the arbitration be specially expeditious”; and (2) the procedure leading to the 
award lacked [certain formal] elements of adjudicatory procedure.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS § 84 (1982). Such elements include, for instance, the opportunity to present and rebut 
evidence. Id., at § 84, cmt. c.  
17 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13; GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 3747-
3748 (2d ed. 2014) (collecting cases); Drahozal, supra note 15, at 6.   
18 See BORN, supra note 17, at 3749 (“Despite the absence of express statutory authority, 
U.S. courts have exercised common law powers to develop a series of rules of preclusion 
applicable to unconfirmed awards.”).  
19 See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 (2008) (“The preclusive effect of a federal-court 
judgment is determined by federal common law.”); Jacobson v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 111 
F.3d 261, 267-68 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that, under New York state law, “res judicata and 
collateral estoppel apply to issues resolved by arbitration where there has been a final 
determination on the merits, notwithstanding a lack of confirmation of the award”) (quotations 
and citations omitted); Val-U Const. Co. of S.D. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 146 F.3d 573, 581 (8th 
Cir.1998) (“The fact that the award in the present case was not confirmed by a court . . . does not 
vitiate the finality of the award.”) (citations and quotations omitted).  
20 Grimes v. BNSF Ry. Co., 746 F.3d 184, 188-89 (5th Cir. 2014). See also Greenblatt v. Drexel 
Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352, 1361 (2d Cir. 1985) (identifying as relevant factors the 
“federal interests in insuring a federal court determination of the federal claim, the expertise of 
the arbitrator and his scope of authority under the arbitration agreement, and the procedural 
adequacy of the arbitration proceeding”).   
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A number of federal courts of appeals have ruled, moreover, that 
arbitrators enjoy the same broad discretion as do courts to give preclusive 
effect to prior arbitration awards.21 When they do, the weight of lower court 
authority establishes that the “rules for unconfirmed domestic awards are 
based upon the applicable state law standards for judicial judgments.”22 And 
the prevailing view among state courts is that arbitration awards can have 
preclusive force in subsequent arbitrations, though California is one notable 
exception.23 Finally, “there is broad agreement” among the federal courts of 
appeals that when the question arises whether a prior arbitration award has 
preclusive force, it is the arbitrator rather than the court that gets to decide 
whether to give preclusive effect to a prior arbitral determination.24 And that 
means that individual arbitration proceedings are also governed by default 
rules set by private arbitration service providers. 
																																								 																				
21 See Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 880 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that “(1) 
[a]rbitrators are not free to ignore the preclusive effect of prior judgments under the doctrines of 
res judicata and collateral estoppel . .  [;] (2) arbitrators are entitled to determine in the first instance 
whether the prerequisites for collateral estoppel are satisfied . . [;]. and (3) arbitrators possess 
broad discretion to determine when they should apply offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel”) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., v. 1109580 Ontario, 
Inc., 409 F.3d 87, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that arbitration panel had discretion to decide 
whether Bear Stearns was collaterally estopped from denying liability based on a prior arbitration 
proceeding and that the panel had not shown a “manifest disregard of the law” in deciding that 
estoppel was not appropriate).  
22 BORN, supra note 18, at 3749. See also Drahozal, supra note 15, at 9-10 (discussing 
uncertainty arising from the Supreme Court’s decision in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 
470 U.S. 213, 222 (1985)).  
23 Compare Riverdale Dev. Co. v. Ruffin Building Sys. Inc. 146 S.W. 3d 852, 860 (Ark. 
2004) (holding that “a party not involved in a prior arbitration may use the award in that 
arbitration to bind his opponent if the party to be bound, or a privy, was before the arbitrator, 
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and the issue was actually decided by the 
arbitrator or was necessary to his decision”) and Bailey v. Metro Prop. & Liability. Ins. Co. 
505 N.E. 2d 908, 910 (Mass. App. 1987) (“An arbitration decision can have preclusive effect 
in the sense described.”) with Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842, 850 (Utah 2004) (holding 
that in Utah “third parties will only be permitted to invoke collateral estoppel in subsequent 
litigation if provided for by the parties to the original arbitration proceeding”) and 
Vanderberg v. Superior Court, 982 P.2d 229, 241-42 (Cal. 1999) (holding that under 
California’s private arbitration statutes, an arbitrator may not give issue preclusive effect to 
a previous award unless the parties agree). See also Jacobson, 111 F.3d at 265 (discussing 
the doctrine under New York state law).  
24 Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau v. OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co., 744 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 2014) 
(collecting cases). See also Drahozal, supra note 15, at 10 (“The U.S. courts of appeals that 
have addressed the issue have consistently held that issue preclusion is a question for the 
arbitrator rather than the court to decide.”).      
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Veteran employment law litigator Zachary Fasman notes that 
“arbitrators are far more skeptical than most courts about giving preclusive 
effect to prior awards.”25 It is not clear, however, that arbitrators will ignore 
the fact that the proceeding in front of them raises similar, if not identical, 
issues to those resolved in a prior proceeding—whether the arbitrators 
formally invoke issue preclusion or simply ask the employer who lost on the 
issue in the prior proceeding why that determination should be departed from 
in the instant proceeding.26 At present the AAA’s Employment Arbitration 
Rules and Mediation Procedures is entirely silent on the question.27 Given 
the prevalence of the AAA in the employment arbitration field, a 
modification of the rules to facilitate reference to prior awards involving the 
same employer and similar, if not identical, issues would help promote 
consistency in arbitral determinations and discourage fruitless relitigation.  
Likewise, while labor arbitrators have traditionally also been resistant 
to the publication of awards—on the ground that the practice promotes 
greater reliance on “precedent” and thereby  sacrifices “one of the great 
advantages of arbitration – its high degree of informality”28—the AAA’s 
employment rules now expressly require the publication of redacted awards 
																																								 																				
25 Zachary Fasman, Offensive, Non-Mutual Collateral Estoppel in Arbitration: The Rush to 
Arbitration’s Ruin?, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 71ST ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE ON LABOR: LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW INITIATIVES, PROPOSALS, AND 
DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 20 (Charlotte Alexander ed.; 
forthcoming, 2019). Fasman notes that “the mechanical application of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel has been fiercely resisted by labor arbitrators.” Id.  Labor arbitrators are 
indeed reluctant to treat awards in other cases as binding precedent, but as a leading labor 
arbitration treatise notes:  
 
Any well-reasoned and well-written prior arbitration opinion has 
persuasive qualities where it is “on point” with the subject matter of a 
current grievance…. [T]o be given preclusive effect it must be between the 
same parties, must invole the same fact situation, must pertain to the same 
contractual provisions, must be supported by the same evidence, and must 
concern an interpretation of the specific agreement before the arbitrator.”  
 
Elkouri & Elkouri, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 11-9 to 11-10 (Kenneth May et al., 7th ed. 2006).  
26 See also id. at 11-7. (Whereas some arbitrators “take the approach that they should not 
look beyond the arguments of the parties” other arbitrators invite parties to cite any prior 
awards they consider relevant, give one party the chance to respond when the other party has 
cited arbitral awards to support its position, and, when neither party had cited any awards, 
“may search for relevant awards on their own”).    
27 By contrast, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) has explicitly noted 
that decisions by FINRA arbitrators “will have no precedential value in other cases.” FINRA 
REGULATORY NOTICE 09-16 (March 2009).   
28 Fasman, supra note 25 (citing Elkouri & Elkouri, supra note 25). 
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in employment arbitration cases.29 And at least three states, including 
California, require arbitration service providers to disclose information about 
the consumer (a term defined to include employee) arbitrations they 
administer.30 California’s requirements include, for example, the “name of 
																																								 																				
29 AAA, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 7, at R. 39(b) (“An award issued 
under these rules shall be publicly available, on a cost basis. The names of the parties and 
witnesses will not be publicly available, unless a party expressly agrees to have its name 
made public in the award.”). The published awards in redacted format are available through 
both the LexisNexis and Westlaw databases.   
30 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West 2015) (amended effective Jan. 1, 2015) (requiring a 
“private arbitration company that administers or is otherwise involved in a consumer arbitration” 
to “collect, publish at least quarterly, and make available to the public on the Internet Web site of 
the private arbitration company, if any, and on paper upon request, a single cumulative report” 
with required information on “each consumer arbitration within the preceding five years”); D.C. 
CODE § 16-4430 (West 2015) (“Any arbitration organization that administers or otherwise is 
involved in 50 or more consumer arbitrations a year shall collect, publish at least quarterly, and 
make available to the public in a computer-searchable database that permits searching with 
multiple search terms in the same search, and is accessible at the Internet website of the arbitration 
organization, if any, and on paper, upon request . . .  information regarding each consumer 
arbitration it has administered or otherwise been involved in within the preceding 5 years”); MD. 
CODE COM. LAW §§ 14-3901 to -3905 (West 2015) (requiring arbitration organization that 
administer 50 or more consumer arbitrations during a 5-year period service provider to “collect, 
publish, and make available to the public . . . information regarding each consumer arbitration for  
each arbitration  during the preceding 5-year period”). While some states—Arkansas, California, 
Missouri, and Texas—have statutes imposing confidentiality requirements on alternative dispute 
resolution proceedings, Christopher Drahozal argues that the Texas statute “does not apply at all 
to contractual arbitration” while the others “arguably do no more than prevent arbitration 
materials from being discovered in or introduced into subsequent court proceedings.” Christopher 
Drahozal, Confidentiality in Consumer and Employment Arbitration, 7 YEARBOOK ON ARB. & 
MEDIATION 28, 33 (2015). See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-206 (West 2015) (“[A] communication 
relating to the subject matter of any civil or criminal dispute made by a participant in a dispute 
resolution process, whether before or after the institution of formal judicial proceedings, is 
confidential and is not subject to disclosure and may not be used as evidence against a participant 
in any judicial or administrative proceeding.”); CAL. EVID. CODE § 703.5 (West 2015) (“No 
person presiding at any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, and no arbitrator or mediator shall 
[unless otherwise provided by the statute] be competent to testify, in any subsequent civil 
proceeding, as to any statement, conduct, decision, or ruling, occurring at or in conjunction with 
the prior proceeding.”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 435.014 (West 2015) (“Arbitration, conciliation and 
mediation proceedings shall be regarded as settlement negotiations. Any communication relating 
to the subject matter of such disputes made during the resolution process by any participant, 
mediator, conciliator, arbitrator or any other person present at the dispute resolution shall be a 
confidential communication. No admission, representation, statement or other confidential 
communication made in setting up or conducting such proceedings not otherwise discoverable or 
obtainable shall be admissible as evidence or subject to discovery.”); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE ANN. § 154.073 (West 2015) (“[Except as otherwise provided], a communication relating 
to the subject matter of any civil or criminal dispute made by a participant in an alternative dispute 
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the nonconsumer party, if the nonconsumer party is a corporation or other 
business entity” (i.e., in employment arbitration, the employer), which party 
prevailed, “[t]he total number of occasions, if any, the nonconsumer party has 
previously been a party in an arbitration administered by the private 
arbitration company,” and “the amount of any monetary award, the amount 
of any attorney’s fees awarded, and any other relief granted, if any.”31  
 
II. OBSTACLES TO USING ISSUE PRECLUSION IN ARBITRATION 
 
Two features of arbitration as a “creature of contract” potentially work 
against the greater use of issue preclusion in the employment arbitration context. 
First, employers may want to limit the potential application of offensive issue 
preclusion by, or have other reasons for, insisting upon confidentiality 
provisions in arbitration clauses in their employment agreements or policies. In 
her Epic Systems dissent, Justice Ginsburg notes as an example the agreement 
between Ernst & Young and the respondent in one of the consolidated cases, 
which stipulates confidentiality for “all aspects of the proceedings.”32 If such 
confidentiality provisions are read to bar all reference to a prior arbitration 
award or proceeding and, so construed, are found to be valid and enforceable 
under state law and the FAA, any restrictions on their operation would kick in 
only after an arbitration award has been confirmed (when rules governing court 
judgments obtain); and many employers might not seek confirmation precisely 
to avoid any reference to prior awards.  
Second, employers might seek simply to limit the preclusive effect of 
arbitration directly through the use of preclusion waivers. For instance, Epic 
Systems Inc.’s employment agreement—also singled out by Justice Ginsburg 
in her Epic Systems dissent—provides that “[t]he arbitrator’s authority shall be 
limited to deciding the case submitted by the parties to the arbitration. 
Therefore, no decision by any arbitrator shall serve as precedent in other 
arbitrations except in a dispute between the same parties, in which case it could 
be used to preclude the same claim from being re-arbitrated.”33 We address 
each of these obstacles in turn.  
																																								 																				
resolution procedure, whether before or after the institution of formal judicial proceedings, is 
confidential, is not subject to disclosure, and may not be used as evidence against the participant 
in any judicial or administrative proceeding.”); In re Cartwright, 104 S.W.3d 706, 711 (Tex. App. 
2003) (“Chapter 154 applies to court-ordered referrals to alternative methods of dispute 
resolution, not to private, contractual agreements to resolve disputes.”).   
31 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96.  
32 Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1648 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Brief for 
Respondents at 6, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16–300).  
33 Application to Petition for Certiorari at 34a, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 
(2018) (No. 16–285).  
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A. Effect of Confidentiality Provisions 
 
Confidentiality provisions pose a practical obstacle to issue preclusion 
insofar as they bar parties from disclosing information that would be needed 
for an arbitrator in a subsequent proceeding to determine whether an issue was 
“actually litigated” or its determination was “necessary” to the prior award. 
Additionally, confidentiality provisions may prevent employees from sharing 
or learning about the outcomes of other arbitrations of similar issues against 
the same employer, as well as deny all parties the ability to use past arbitrations 
as precedent. Courts that have declined to enforce confidentiality provisions 
have relied on the state law doctrine of unconscionability or on the federal 
common law doctrine that bars contractual provisions that prevent the 
“effective vindication” of statutory rights.  
 
1. State Law Restrictions on Confidentiality 
 
Courts that have found confidentiality provisions unconscionable and 
therefore unenforceable have done so mainly on two related but distinct 
grounds. First, as held by the Ninth Circuit in a series of cases interpreting 
California law (until a California Court of Appeal ruled otherwise in 2014),34 
arbitration agreements are unconscionable if they put the employer “in a far 
superior legal posture” relative to its employees—by denying them access to 
precedent while at the same time accumulating that knowledge as a “repeat 
player” or barring “an employee from contacting other employees to assist in 
litigating (or arbitrating) an employee’s case.”35 Second, as held by the 
																																								 																				
34 Sanchez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California, LLC, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 473, 481 (Cal. 
App. 2014) (holding that confidentiality provision that covers the “hearing and record of the 
proceeding” is enforceable under California law).       
35 Davis v. O’Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1078 (2006), overruled on other grounds by 
Ferguson v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 733 F.3d 928, 937 (9th Cir. 2013); Ting v. AT&T, 319 
F.3d 1126, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We conclude . . . that if the company succeeds in imposing 
a gag order, plaintiffs are unable to mitigate the advantages inherent in [the employer’s] being 
a repeat player.”); cf. Narayan v. Ritz-Carlton Dev. Co., 400 P.3d 544, 556 (Haw. 2017) 
(holding that the confidentiality provision of the arbitration clause in an agreement between 
individual home owners and condominium developer is substantively unconscionable because 
it “impairs the Homeowners’ ability to investigate and pursue their claims”); Schnuerle v. 
Insight Commc’ns Co., L.P., 376 S.W.3d 561, 578 (Ky. 2012) (holding that the confidentiality 
provision barring the disclosure of the “existence, content or results of any arbitration or award” 
is unconscionable because it gives the company “an unyielding advantage over individual 
customers”); Sprague v. Household Int’l, 473 F. Supp. 2d 966, 974 (W.D. Mo. 2005) (holding 
that a confidentiality provision requiring that “the award . . . be kept confidential” is 
unconscionable under Missouri law because “Household reaps the advantages of repeatedly 
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Washington Supreme Court, in hampering “an employee’s ability . . . to take 
advantage of findings in past arbitrations,” a confidentiality provision can be 
found unconscionable because it “undermines an employee’s confidence in 
the fairness and honesty of the arbitration process and thus . . .  potentially 
discourages that employee from pursuing a valid claim.” 36  
While it was once the case that the larger number of jurisdictions held 
confidentiality provisions to be unconscionable and therefore unenforceable,37 
more recent decisions suggest a greater divergence in views if not a trend away 
from the anti-enforcement position. Most notably, a  2014 California appellate 
ruling declared that “we see nothing unreasonable or prejudicial” about a 
confidentiality provision that covers the “hearing and record of the 
proceeding.”38 The Ninth Circuit subsequently followed suit.39 Even before 
																																								 																				
appearing before the same group of arbitrators, while consumers do not”). But see Iberia Credit 
Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 175 (5th Cir. 2004) (“While the 
confidentiality requirement is probably more favorable to the cellular provider than to its 
customer, the plaintiffs have not persuaded us that the requirement is so offensive as to be 
invalid” or unenforceable under Louisiana law.); Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Serv., VI, Inc., 368 
F.3d 269 (3d. Cir. 2004) (holding that confidentiality provisions are not unconscionable under 
the law of the U.S. Virgin Islands, as “there is nothing inherent in confidentiality itself that 
favors or burdens one party vis-a-vis the other in the dispute resolution process”); Vasquez-
Lopez v. Beneficial Oregon, Inc., 152 P.3d 940, 952-53 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that 
confidentiality provision stating the arbitration award “shall be kept confidential” is “roughly 
even-handed in effect” on the parties and thus enforceable because the provision does not apply 
to facts, parties, arbitrators’ identities, arguments, or outcomes and because “nonconfidential 
information, while not officially reported, is widely available to plaintiffs’ lawyers through 
informal networks and organizations”).  
36 Zuver v. Airtouch Commc’ns, Inc., 103 P.3d 753, 765 (Wash. 2004). See also Larsen v. 
Citibank FSB, 871 F.3d 1295, 1319 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding as substantively 
unconscionable under Washington law a provision that, while not “prevent[ing] consumers 
[as a class] from sharing discovery, fact patterns, or briefing from other similar arbitrations,” 
“prohibits disclosure only of ultimate decisions by an arbitrator” and may therefore “have 
the effect of discouraging consumers from pursuing valid claims); Delta Funding Corp. v. 
Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 117 (N.J. 2006) (“It is not unconscionable to require that the 
proceedings before the arbitrator be kept confidential when the arbitrator’s written award is 
not required to be kept confidential.”).  
37 See Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscion-
ability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 218-19 (2004) (“The majority of courts have held these provisions 
unconscionable. Only a few courts have found otherwise.”). As Christopher Drahozal notes, 
“[c]ases decided since Professor Randall published her article are more evenly divided on the 
enforceability of confidentiality provisions.” Drahozal, supra note 30, at 44-45 n.67.  
38 Sanchez, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d at 481-82.  
39 Poublon v. C.H. Robinson Co., 846 F.3d 1251, 1266 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that 
confidentiality provision was substantively identical to that considered in Carmax and 
enforceable notwithstanding the public policy argument that “such confidentiality provisions 
inhibit employees from discovering evidence from each other”) (internal quotation omitted).   
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that, however, the Ninth Court had limited its restrictions on confidentiality 
provisions to cases that involve a “large class of customers.”40 And relying on 
that reasoning, some state courts have ruled or indicated in dicta that they 
would enforce confidentiality provisions if the number of plaintiffs falls short 
of the 120 that the Ninth Circuit refused to regard as a “large class.”41  
 
2. FAA Preemption of State Law Restrictions on Confidentiality 
 
Even where courts have found that confidentiality provisions to be 
unenforceable under state law, recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions raise the 
question whether such rulings are preempted by the FAA. That is because the 
Court has narrowly construed the so-called “savings clause” in Section 2 of 
the FAA, which provides that arbitration clauses are “valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.”42 As interpreted in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Conception,43 the clause “permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated 
[only] by generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability.”44 Limiting what counts as a “generally applicable 
contract defense,” the Conception Court cautioned that courts may not “rely 
on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law 
holding that enforcement would be unconscionable.”45 In essence, judicial 
attempts to interfere with the “fundamental attributes of arbitration” are not 
saved by Section 2 and are preempted by the FAA.  
And while we are not aware of any decision that treats confidentiality 
as a fundamental attribute of arbitration as such, the Fifth Circuit has 
suggested that restrictions on confidentiality are “in part, an attack on the 
																																								 																				
40 Kilgore v. Keybank, N.A., 718 F.3d 1052, 1059 n.9 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Although we have 
found confidentiality provisions to be substantively unconscionable when applied to a large 
class of customers . . . the small number of putative class members in this case 
(approximately 120) mitigates such concerns.”) (citations omitted). 
41 See African Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc. v. Smith, 217 So.3d 816, 826 (Ala. 2016) 
(holding that confidentiality clause was not unconscionable, in part because “[t]he instant cases 
do not involve a class at all; rather, they involve only two plaintiffs, and there is no suggestion 
that the number of individuals holding potential claims against the defendants could approach 
even the 120 in Kilgore”); Machado v. System4 LLC, 28 N.E.3d 401, 415 (Mass. 2015) (dicta) 
(“Here, while a motion for class certification has yet to be filed, the putative class consists of 
franchisees, a relatively small and known quantity of individuals. Any gains System4 might 
gather from the typical ‘repeat player’ effect are therefore diminished.”).  
42 9 U.S.C. § 2 
43 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).   
44 Id. at 339 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
45 Id. at 341. 
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character of arbitration itself.”46 If confidentiality cannot be imposed, the 
Fifth Circuit panel reasoned, “one would expect that parties contemplating 
arbitration would demand discovery similar to that permitted under 
F.R.Civ.P. Rule 26, adherence to formal rules of evidence, more extensive 
appellate review, and so forth—in short, all of the procedural accoutrements 
that accompany a judicial proceeding.”47  
On the other hand, some courts have continued to hold confidentiality 
clauses unconscionable even after Concepcion, with the Supreme Court of 
Kentucky noting that “the potential obstacles to arbitration presented by the 
forbidding of class action waivers are simply not present in the case of 
confidentially provisions.”48 Indeed, in a context in which the parties to an 
employment arbitration proceeding must anticipate that at least some awards 
will be challenged in court, and where the disclosure rules of the AAA and 
other arbitration services organizations require prospective arbitrators to list 
prior awards involving the same employer party, it is unclear whether a limited 
carve-out from confidentiality sufficient to assess whether a party’s plea that 
claim or issue preclusion is warranted in a particular case in fact undermines 
the core benefit of confidentiality. Likewise, the FAA arguably leaves 
untouched state restrictions on confidentiality provisions insofar as those 
provisions conflict with a “strong policy that justice should be administered 
openly and publicly” and such a policy is applied even-handedly to all forms 
of adjudication.49 Given a well-establish common law right to public judicial 
documents, discussed below, it would seem difficult to argue that state laws 
requiring the publication of redacted arbitration awards or limited disclosure 
of prior awards involving the same employer and the same or similar issue, 
																																								 																				
46 Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 175 (5th Cir. 2004). 
47 Id. at 176. The empirical premise underlying the Fifth Circuit’s observation is questioned 
in Drahozal, supra note 30, at 44-46. 
48 Schnuerle v. Insight Commc’ns Co., L.P., 376 S.W.3d 561, 578 (Ky. 2012). But see 
Damato v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., No. 13–CV–994 (ARR)(RML), 2013 WL 3968765, at 
*12 (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 31, 2013) (“While the Court did not address directly a claim that an 
arbitration clause was unconscionable because of a requirement of confidentiality, the 
writing is on the wall: the confidentiality of proceedings does not, by itself, render an 
agreement to arbitrate unconscionable.”).  
49 See McKee v. AT&T Corp., 191 P.3d 845, 858-59 (Wash. 2008) (“Washington has a strong 
policy that justice should be administered openly and publicly. Under our constitution, [j]ustice 
in all cases shall be administered openly . . . We hold that the confidentiality provision before 
us is substantively unconscionable.”) (brackets in the original) (internal citations omitted, 
including Dreiling v. Jain, 93 P.3d 861, 869-71 (Wash. 2004) (holding that under state 
constitutional requirement of open administration of justice, the motion, and documents filed 
with the court in support of it, cannot be sealed unless the court follows the analytical approach 
set out by the Washington Supreme Court)). 
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discussed above, undermine arbitration’s unique features or implicate the 
FAA’s equal-treatment rule requiring that arbitration agreements be treated no 
differently than any other contract. 50  
 
3. Exceptions to Federal Preemption 
 
It is commonplace that private arbitration agreements cannot require 
waiver of a party’s substantive federal or state statutory rights,51 but it is doubtful 
that employees have a federal statutory right to a public arbitral proceeding or 
published awards. Courts inclined to rule that restrictions on confidentiality 
clauses are not preempted by the FAA because imposing confidentiality on 
employees denies them the ability to effectively vindicate their statutory rights 
will find that the Supreme Court has significantly narrowed the so-called 
“effective vindication” doctrine. In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurants,52 the Court held that the doctrine invalidates only a “prospective 
waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies.” In that case, the fact that 
an expert would need to be hired to prosecute the antitrust claim and that, without 
a class action, attorneys could not readily finance the expert’s fees, made it more 
difficult but did not eliminate the right to pursue the statutory remedy.53  
There is some life left in the “effective vindication” doctrine when it 
comes to cost barriers to being able to invoke the arbitration process. In Green 
Tree Financial Corporation–Alabama v. Randolph, the Court left open the 
possibility that the imposition of “large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant 
. . . from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights.”54 Relying on 
Randolph, the Tenth Circuit invalidated an arbitration agreement in its entirety 
containing a clause providing that “[e]ach party shall bear the expense of its own 
counsel” because the agreement would prevent a plaintiff from vindicating her 
rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).55 In many employment 
																																								 																				
50 Kindred Nursing Ctrs. L.P. v. Clark, 137 S.Ct. 1421, 1426 (2017) (“9 U.S.C. § 2 establishes an 
equal-treatment principle: A court may invalidate an arbitration agreement based on generally 
applicable contract defenses like fraud or unconscionability, but not on legal rules that apply only 
to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”). 
51  See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (“By 
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by 
the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”) 
52 570 U.S. 228, 235 (2013).  
53Id. at 235-36 (“But the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory 
remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”).  
54 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000).  
55 Nesbitt v. FCNH, 811 F.3d 371, 380 (10th Cir. 2016). The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), 
requires a district court to order a defendant to pay “a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . and costs 
of the action” to a successful plaintiff. (Emphasis added).  
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arbitrations based on statutory claims, the question of forum costs does not arise 
because the AAA requires the employer to pay those costs, save for a non-
refundable filing fee capped at $300 unless the arbitration agreement provides 
that the individual pay less.56 Attorney’s fees are awarded in accordance with the 
fee allocation provisions of the substantive law governing the dispute.57 
 
4. Confidentiality and the Enforcement of Awards 
 
Any confidentiality bar, however, is likely to drop out once a party seeks 
to confirm or enforce an arbitration award in court,58 where a strong presumption 
obtains that the award and (at a minimum) dispositive pleadings produced during 
the arbitration must remain open to public view, notwithstanding even the 
existence of a confidentiality provision in the agreement.59 This presumption 
flows, as recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nixon v. Warner 
Communications, Inc.,60 from a well-established right of access to “judicial 
records.”61 In order to seal a judicial order confirming an arbitration award, 
courts use a balancing test to determine whether the presumption of public access 
is overcome by compelling interests that favor non-disclosure.62 
																																								 																				
56 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, EMPLOYMENT/WORKPLACE FEE SCHEDULE, 
COSTS OF ARBITRATION (effective October 1, 2017), www.adr.org. 
57 See, e.g., Folck v. Lennar Corporation, No.: 3:17-cv-00992-L-NLS, 2018 WL 1726617, at 
*11 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2018) (holding that an agreement containing fee/cost shifting 
provisions “provides that the arbitrator may award fees and costs, but only to the extent 
authorized by applicable law.”)     
58 The AAA’s employment arbitration rules expressly provide that “[p]arties to these 
procedures shall be deemed to have consented that judgment upon the arbitration award may 
be entered in any federal or state court having jurisdiction.” AAA, EMPLOYMENT ARBI-
TRATION RULES, supra note 10, at R. 42c.  
59 Drahozal, supra note 30, at 32, n.14 (collecting cases). See, e.g., Ovonic Battery Co., Inc. 
v. Sanyo Elec. Co., Ltd, No. 14-cv-01637-JD, 2014 WL 2758756, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 
2014) (holding that motion to seal arbitration awards because they contain “sensitive terms 
of confidential licenses” was “not narrowly tailored”); Century Indem. Co. v. AXA Belgium, 
No. 11 CIV. 7263 JMF, WL 4354816, at *24-25 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2012) (holding that, 
while the “public interest in the relationship between an insurer and its reinsurers is relatively 
low,” “the parties have not identified sufficient countervailing factors to overcome the 
presumption in favor of access”). 
60 435 U.S. 589 (1978).  
61 Id. at 607.  
62 Compare, e.g., Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding a “strong 
presumption” that a record of judicial proceeding is public) with Decapolis Grp., LLC v. 
Mangesh Energy, Ltd., No. 3:13-cv-1547-M, 2014 WL 702000, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 
2014) (holding “that any public interest in the Award is minimal and counterbalanced by the 
interest in confidentiality expressed in the parties’ agreement”).  
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Courts apply different standards to determine what counts as a “judicial 
record.”63 The Second Circuit, for instance, has endorsed two separate 
approaches.64 Under the first approach, the public has a right of access to judicial 
records (1) that “have historically been open to the press and general public,” and 
(2) where “public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the 
particular process in question.”65 Under the second approach, the right of access 
is “derived from or [as] a necessary corollary of the capacity to attend the relevant 
proceedings.”66 Relying on these approaches, lower courts consider it “well-
settled”67 that “the petition, memoranda, and other supporting documents filed in 
																																								 																				
63 Compare, e.g., City of Greenville, Ill. v. Syngenta Crop Prot., LLC, 764 F.3d 695, 697 (7th 
Cir. 2014) (limiting the “presumption of public access” to documents that affect the disposition 
of the litigation) and United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1255 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding 
that fee, cost, and expense vouchers submitted by counsel appointed for indigent defendants 
under Criminal Justice Act (CJA) are not judicial documents because they are “not directly 
related to the process of adjudication”) with Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 
780 (3rd Cir. 1994) (holding that a settlement agreement is not a “judicial record” because it 
was never filed with the court). See also Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 
970 A.2d 656, 680 (Conn. 2009) (“The vast majority of courts examine whether the document 
filed reasonably may be relied upon in support of the adjudicatory process, regardless of 
whether the decision is a dispositive one.”)        
64 See generally In re N.Y. Times Co. to Unseal Wiretap & Search Warrant Materials, 577 
F.3d 401, 408-11 (2009) (holding that wiretap applications are not judicial documents to 
which the public has a right of access).   
65 Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 92 (2004) (citing Press–Enterprise Co. 
v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986)). 
66 Pellegrino, 380 F.3d at 93. The second approach has its roots in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 556, 580 (1980), in which the Supreme Court found itself “bound to 
conclude that the presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our 
system of justice” and held that the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the First 
Amendment. While the Court declined to consider whether the public has a right to attend trials 
of civil cases, it noted that “historically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively 
open.” Id. at 580 n.17. As the Second Circuit noted in Pellegrino, 380 F.3d at 91, several courts 
of appeals have held that the First Amendment covers civil as well as criminal proceedings. See, 
e.g., Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir.1984) (“[T]he First 
Amendment does secure to the public and to the press a right of access to civil proceedings”). 
Lower courts, moreover, have relied on the presumption of openness identified in Richmond 
Newspapers to extend First Amendment protections to “the public’s capacity to inspect” judicial 
documents related to court proceedings. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d at 92 (collecting cases).     
67 Aioi Nissay Dowa Ins. Co. v. ProSight Specialty Mgmt. Co., No. 12 Civ. 3274(JPO), 2012 
WL 3583176, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2012) (rejecting motion to seal confirmed arbitration 
award in a contractual dispute between two companies notwithstanding a confidentiality 
provision in their agreement that provides that “all submissions of Arbitration Information 
to a court shall be sealed”); see generally Alexandria Real Estate Equities, Inc. v. Fair, 2011 
WL 6015646, at *2 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 30, 2011) (holding that arbitration awards and supporting 
documents are judicial records).  
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connection with a petition to confirm an arbitration award (including the Final 
Award itself) are judicial documents.”  
The presumption in favor of disclosure of judicial records does not 
kick in, however, if the winning party in the first arbitration does not seek 
judicial confirmation of the arbitration award—as is likely to be the case if 
the employee prevailing on, say, a discharge has no need to go to court for 
confirmation or enforcement of the award. Thus, if confidentiality provisions 
are valid and enforceable, and are properly interpreted to block access to the 
awards and documents generated in prior arbitrations involving the same 
employer, there will be no basis for invoking claim or issue preclusion absent 
independent knowledge of what was decided in a prior arbitration involving 
the same employer. 
 
B. Proposed Disclosure Protocol 
 
In order to secure the advantages of consistency of outcome and 
discourage repetitive arbitration of previously decided issues, we propose that 
the AAA update Rule 23 of its Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation 
Procedures. In its current form, Rule 23 imposes an obligation of 
confidentiality solely on the arbitrator, who “shall maintain the confidentiality 
of the arbitration and shall have the authority to make appropriate rulings to 
safeguard that confidentiality, unless the parties agree otherwise or the law 
provides to the contrary.”68 Our proposal would create a limited exception that 
permits a subsequent arbitrator to disclose a prior award and opinion in cases 
(1) involving multiple arbitration of statutory employment claims against the 
same employer and (2) which involve similar issues –  unless the parties to the 
previous arbitration had expressly agreed that the award and opinion may not 
be disclosed to non-parties or the second arbitrator finds that the harms caused 
by such disclosure outweigh any commensurate benefits.  
Our proposed disclosure protocol preserves the recognized benefits of 
confidentiality in arbitration proceedings. For example, it leaves untouched 
AAA Rule 23’s requirement preventing the arbitrator from disclosing the details 
of the prior proceeding; the proposed disclosure exception is limited to the prior 
award and any opinion accompanying the award.69 The proposal, moreover, 
establishes a default rule that the parties can opt out of but only by express 
provision. In addition, even in the absence of such an express provision, the 
																																								 																				
68 AAA, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 10, at R. 23.  
69 The proposal is also consistent with Rule 9, which provides that “[t]he arbitrator shall have 
the authority to order such discovery, by way of deposition, interrogatory, document 
production, or otherwise, as the arbitrator considers necessary to a full and fair exploration 
of the issues in dispute, consistent with the expedited nature of arbitration.” Id. at R. 9.  
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proposal permits arbitrators to take into account the interests of the employer in 
sealing or redacting documents, the same way courts engage in a balancing 
analysis when deciding to confirm arbitration awards under seal. As held by the 
Seventh Circuit, for instance, “[w]hen there is a compelling interest in secrecy, 
as in the case of trade secrets, the identity of informers, and the privacy of 
children, portions and in extreme cases the entirety of a trial record can be 
sealed.”70 Arbitrators, likewise, may decide to enforce confidentiality provisions 
where doing so would be the sole way to prevent the disclosure of highly 
embarrassing but otherwise irrelevant facts, and the risks of such disclosure are 
sufficiently compelling to outweigh the value of determining the preclusive 
effect of the issues on which those facts bring to bear.71  
 
C. Effect of Preclusion Waivers 
 
The foregoing proposal does not prevent employers who do not wish 
to have arbitration awards given preclusive effect from simply contracting 
out of issue preclusion entirely. As stated in the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgements, “[i]f the terms of an agreement to arbitrate limit the binding 
effect of the award in another adjudication or arbitration proceeding, the 
extent to which the award has conclusive effect is determined in accordance 
with that limitation.”72 As Christopher Drahozal has noted, “courts and 
commentators have followed the Restatement rule that parties can modify the 
binding effect of awards by contract, most commonly in the context of claim 
preclusion but occasionally in the context of issue preclusion as well.”73  
																																								 																				
70 Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2002). 
71 Because the only non-parties that would benefit from our proposed exception would be 
employees engaged in individualized arbitration of similar issues against the same employer, 
the exception is unlikely to result in the disclosure of firm practices or trade secrets beyond 
those employees who are themselves bound by confidentiality provisions. The risks of 
information spillage are thus limited.  
72 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 84(4) (1982). 
73 Drahozal, supra note 15, at 14. See, e.g. Anderson v. Beland (In re Am. Exp. Fin. Advisors 
Sec. Litig.), 672 F.3d 113, 133 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting dicta from Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 
194 (7th Cir.1996)) (“Given the contractual nature of arbitration, it can be argued that the 
preclusive effect of either a judicial judgment or an arbitration award on a subsequent arbitration 
should depend on what the parties agreed to. And then the court will decide as a matter of 
interpretation of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate whether the arbitrators can ignore a prior 
judicial judgment.”); IDS Life Ins. Co. v. Royal Alliance Ass’n, Inc., 266 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 
2001) (dicta) (“Although res judicata and collateral estoppel usually attach to arbitration awards . 
. . they do so (if they do so) as a matter of contract rather than as a matter of law. The preclusive 
effect of the award is as much a creature of the arbitration contract as any other aspect of the legal-
dispute machinery established by such a contract.”) (internal citations omitted).  
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In a noteworthy exception, however, the New York Appellate 
Division, Second Department held that a contractual provision limiting the 
preclusive effect of awards is enforceable only insofar as it “reflects either 
the parties’ expectations not to fully litigate issues, or the parties’ 
acknowledgment that they did not fully litigate.”74 That case involved a legal 
malpractice claim for the lawyer’s failing to preserve the issue of the 
preclusive effect of a prior arbitration brought by the lawyer’s client against 
his accountant. Even though the arbitration agreement with the accountant 
included a preclusion waiver, the factual record showed that “there was 
extensive pre-hearing discovery; that there were 18 days of hearings before a 
panel of three arbitrators; that 16 witnesses testified; that the depositions of 
most of the 34 deponents as well as 1,450 exhibits were introduced into 
evidence.”75 Accordingly, the court held that “[n]othing in the relevant case 
law supports Feinberg’s argument as to the validity of a limitation agreement 
made after arbitration, after litigating the issues fully, vigorously and 
exhaustively, and where the agreement is directed at one third party after 
other third parties have asserted collateral estoppel defenses based on the 
arbitration award.”76 Given that the court’s holding was limited to the use of 
collateral estoppel by a third-party defendant in a commercial dispute, no 
court has to our knowledge extended this reasoning to offensive, non-mutual 
issue preclusion.  
 
D. Proposed Limitation on Preclusion Waivers 
 
Here, too, the AAA should consider revising its rules and perhaps its 
Employment Due Process Protocol to explicitly provide that, in cases 
involving multiple arbitration of statutory employment claims against the 
same employer, the arbitrator has discretion to give preclusive effect to an 
issue decided in a prior arbitral proceeding against the same employer. In 
making this determination, the arbitrator should consider (1) whether the 
claimant before it had an opportunity to appear in the prior arbitration; (2) 
whether the issue in the prior arbitration is the same as the issue before the 
present arbitrator; (3) whether the issue was fully litigated, (4) whether its 
resolution in the prior arbitration was necessary to the award rendered in that 
prior proceeding. We also propose that where (1) the agreement between the 
parties expressly limits consideration of the effect of a prior arbitration 
involving such claims against the same employer and (2) neither party has 
																																								 																				
74 Feinberg v. Boros, 951 N.Y.S.2d 110, 116 (1st Dept. 2012).   
75 Id. at 117 
76 Id. 
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sought judicial confirmation of the prior award, the arbitrator should enforce 
such a preclusion waiver –  unless a statutory basis exists for invalidating or 
giving the arbitrator discretion to invalidate such a clause.  
 
III. OBJECTIONS TO USING COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN ARBITRATION 
 
Our proposals are designed to meet two concerns about extending the 
doctrine of issue preclusion further into the world of arbitration. Zachary Fasman 
has recently argued, for example, that the use of non-mutual issue preclusion 
creates perverse incentives for plaintiffs to “wait for a favorable arbitral opinion 
to be handed down before bringing a cause of action against a common 
defendant.”77 Fasman insists that the use of issue preclusion in arbitration 
becomes unworkable when multiple arbitrations of the same issue result in 
conflicting awards and parties then seek to have the awards enforced in court.  
On Fasman’s first point, if the claimant seeking non-mutual issue 
preclusion could have intervened in the prior arbitral proceeding, that would 
be a conclusive basis for denying issue preclusive effect to determinations 
made in that proceeding. If the arbitration agreement bars joinder of claims, 
however, such a clause would provide ample justification for not intervening 
in the prior proceeding. 
On Fasman’s second point, the Supreme Court in Parklane counseled 
against applying offensive issue preclusion “if the judgment relied upon as a 
basis for the estoppel is itself inconsistent with one or more previous 
judgments in favor of the defendant.”78 Issue preclusion is not likely where 
prior awards have resulted in disparate results. It may well be that non-mutual 
issue preclusion will be recognized only when the employer has lost on the 
same issue in at least two or more arbitrations and there are no conflicting 
decisions, but that is precisely the kind of situation that calls for preventing 
the employer from fighting a war of attrition against claimants—a war that 
could not be fought in court and which no fundamental feature of arbitration 
requires that it be fought in arbitration.  
And while some employers may decide, after losing enough cases, to 
settle anyway, the greater use of issue preclusion by arbitrators can help expedite 
that outcome and avoid unnecessary litigation. In an illustrative case in the 
Seventh Circuit,79 changes made by an employer to its staffing procedures to 
avoid having to pay overtime wages led the union to sue, claiming the changes 
were in violation of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. Seven 
																																								 																				
77 Fasman, supra note 25, at 31.  
78 Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 330.  
79 Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 12, 213 F.3d 404 (7th 
Cir. 2000). 
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arbitrations ensued, with the employer prevailing in all but the fourth arbitration. 
The union, however, obtained confirmation of the sole pro-union award before 
the employer could do likewise for the other six awards, and tried to block the 
employer from obtaining confirmation of the remaining awards. Rejecting the 
union’s argument, the appeals court noted that “by failing to argue preclusion to 
the fourth arbitrator, the employer forfeited a good defense that would have 
headed off the confusion that ensued.”80 The case also illustrates that, even if 
litigation of avoidable disputes in arbitration does not waste judicial resources 
directly, those resources are nonetheless still put to use when courts are later 
asked to confirm and enforce multiple awards. 
Finally, even when multiple arbitrations result in several conflicting 
awards, it becomes all the more important that the AAA promote transparency, 
such that arbitrators can consider the outcomes of several ongoing arbitrations 
before applying collateral estoppel—even if they are not ultimately bound by 
them. That is one reason we propose amending AAA Rule 23 to permit 
disclosure of information that is relevant to determining the preclusive effect 
of previous arbitration awards involving the same employer.81 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In view of the Supreme Court’s decision in Epic Systems, it becomes 
imperative to take up the challenge of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent and see if there 
are ways to capture some of the efficiency gains of employment class actions 
																																								 																				
80 Id. at 407.  
81 It may be objected that arbitration providers like the AAA will be reluctant to adopt the 
default rules we propose here unless competing providers do so as well. Likewise, it may be 
objected that, even if these rules would be implemented, employers would be likely nearly 
always to opt out of preclusion entirely. We believe it is in the interest of most employers, if 
they wish to avoid adverse public reaction that could lead to a wholesale revision of the 
Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence, to agree to rules of basic fairness in employment 
arbitration. See, e.g. Letter from State Attorneys General to Congressional Leadership (Feb. 
12, 2018) (on file with authors) (asking Congress to enact legislation to “ensure access” to 
courts for victims of sexual harassment in the workplace and applauding Microsoft Corporation 
for announcing that “it will discontinue arbitration requirements with respect to sexual 
harassment claims and for supporting legislation to ensure that victims of sexual harassment be 
accorded the right of access to our judicial system to the courts”). This has been the experience 
with adoption in the mid-1990s of the Due Process Protocol by leading arbitration providers 
and its widespread acceptance by employers. See Samuel Estreicher & Zev Eigen, The Forum 
for Adjudication of Employment Disputes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 418 (Michael L. Wachter & Cynthia L. Estlund eds. 2012, 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.) (noting that the Due Process Protocol has been widely and 
voluntarily adopted by companies and both the AAA and JAMS, and advocating for an 
updating of the Protocol to capture issues that have become salient since the Protocol).  
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without compromising the core benefits of bilateral arbitration proceeding 
between the employer and its employee. As one of us has argued, “if it is 
properly structured and regulated,” employment arbitration “improves the 
likelihood that employees, and most especially those who are relatively low-
paid, will be able to obtain an adjudication on the merits of their rights disputes 
with the employer.”82 We believe that greater use of issue preclusion in 
arbitration, subject to the conditions laid down by the Supreme Court in 
Parklane, can promote a fairer process for both the employer and its employees.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
82 Estreicher & Eigen, supra note 81, at 419; see also Samuel Estreicher, The Supreme Court Did 
Workers a Favor: Class Action Lawsuits Are the Wrong Way to Settle Employment Disputes, 
BLOOMBERG VIEW (May 24, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-05-24/how 
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